This paper examines the effects of Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs) on household saving using data from the 1983-86 Survey of Consumer Finances. We construct a formal model of dynamic utility maximization that We gratefully acknowledge the work of Robert Avery and Arthur Kenickell in developing cleaned copy of the 1983-86 Survey of Consumer Finances and in providing extensive documentation. We also thank
IRAs and Household Saving I. Introduction
In recent years, chronically low levels of U.S. saving have generated considerable concern among academics and policy makers. One frequently suggested method for raising the saving rate is to expand Individual Retirement Accounts (IRAs). First established in 1974 to help workers without pension plans save for retirement, IRAs featured tax-deductible contributions up to an annual limit, tax-free accrual of interest and substantial penalties for withdrawal before the account-holder reached the age of 59-l/2. In 1981, in an effort to stimulate aggregate saving, eligibility was extended to all taxpayers and the contribution limits were raised. In 1986, the tax-deductibility of contributions was curtailed and the penalty for early withdrawal r a i s e d . ' However, Congress and the Administration are currently considering several new proposals to expand IRAs and to create similar programs aimed at saving for educational and housing expenses.
Although IRAs have proven very popular, 2 the important economic issue
is not their use per se, but whether IRAs raise the overall level of saving.
IRAs would not increase saving if households choose to transfer already 'Currently, IRAs feature annual contribution limits of $4,000 ($2250) for a married couple with two workers (one worker) and $2,000 for a single person, and an early withdrawal penalty of 15%. Deductibility of contributions is phased out for married couples (singles) with income in the range of $40,000-$50,000 ($25,000-$35,000).
2 From 1982-86, IRAs accounted for approximately 25% of all personal saving. After the program was restricted in 1986, the corresponding figure fell to 14% in 1987. See Statistics of Income, Table 1 , recent years, and Economic Report of the President, 1990, Table C-26 . e x i s t i n g t a x a b l e a s s e t s i n t o IRAs.
3 Asset transfers would occur if households found IRAs and other saving to be good substitutes. I n f a c t , overall saving could actually fall in the presence of IRAS b e c a u s e IRAs provide a higher rate of return on a limited amount of saving. I f t h e household is already saving large amounts, the increased return will induce a wealth effect, which will reduce saving if consumption is a normal good, but will provide no marginal incentive to save.
A l t e r n a t i v e l y , IRAs would raise the overall level of saving if they were funded from resources that would otherwise have been consumed. This would occur if IRAs were poor substitutes for other assets in households* p o r t f o l i o s . T h u s , the issue of whether IRAs raise saving hinges on the source of IRA contrlbutions--consumption or other saving--which in turn depends on the substitutability of IRAs and other forms of saving.
Previous research on this issue using aggregate data has produced mixed r e s u l t s . Carroll and Summers (1987) point out that the Canadian saving rate rose relative to the American rate in the mid 1970's when Canada liberalized its tax-deferred retirement saving plan. Feenberg and Skinner (1989b) show that the relation between the aggregate level of IRAs and other saving depends critically on the definition of saving.
Previous research using microeconomic data, including Hubbard (1984) , Venti and Wise (1986 , 1987a , 1987b , and Feenberg and Skinner (1989a) has established an important empirical regularity: households that contribute to IRAS also tend to save more in other forms, hording observable f a c t o r s c o n s t a n t . O n e i n t e r p r e t a t i o n o f t h i s r e s u l t is that IRAs raise the 'Feenberg and Skinner (1989a) refer to such transfers as portfolio " r e s h u f f l i n g . "
It should also be clear that IRAs funded by borrowing do not represent increases in saving.
overall level of saving.
However, an alternative interpretation is that there are groups in the population with different preferences for saving, again holding observable factors constant. These differences complicate the task of measuring the effect of IRAs on saving. For example, suppose there exist two groups, "large savers" and "small savers," due, say, to differences in subjective discount rates. Holding observable factors constant, we would expect to see that IRA holders (where "large savers" were over-represented) would also save more than households without IRAs (where "small savers" would be overrepresented). That is, we would observe the empirical regularity documented in the literature. However, IRAs could still be perfect substitutes for other assets; if so, IRAs would not raise saving.
This paper reexamines the interactions between IRAs and other saving, using a new micro data set and employing a different theoretical and empirical approach from previous studies. In Section II, we show that there are sizable differences in the asset holdings of IRA holders and households without IRAs, and argue that the effects of IRAs on saving will depend on how those who contribute to IRAs (rather than the population as a whole) view the substitutability of IRAs and other saving. We present evidence that most contributors are either 59 or older or have large amounts of non-IRA financial assets. These households may well find IRAs and other saving to be very good substitutes. We also review the previous literature on IRAs and raise some issues concerning model formulation and interpretation of results.
In Section III, we develop a dynamic model of utility maximization that incorporates several important institutional features of IRAs and leads to closed form equations for IRA and other saving. The model is used to formalize several insights into the effects of IRAs on other saving and to provide a framework for the empirical analysis. In section IV, we present and estimate an empirical version of the model and simulate the effects of increasing the annual contribution limit. 4 The effect of a limit change is a slightly different issue than "the effect of IRAs on the level of saving. The latter question can be thought of as the effect of changing the annual contribution limit from zero to a given level. This paper addresses the effects of increases in limits from their existing levels in 1983-85. 5 The SCF is described in Avery and Elliehausen (1988) and Avery and Kenfckell (1988a) , and has been used in analyses by Avery et al (1984a Avery et al ( , 1984b , Avery and Kenickell (1988b) , and others.
(B) Asset Substitutability. Characteristics of IRA Holders and the
Reshufflin g H y p o t h e s i s
Given the features of IRAs described in the Introduction, the o n l y reason IRAs would not be perfect substitutes for other saving is the penalty for early withdrawal. Any household who believed it would not have to cash in her saving until after the age of 59-l/2 would find IRAs to be a p e r f e c t substitute for other saving. Each period, the household would first place all saving into an IRA until the limit was reached; only then would it save in other forms. If the household's saving exceeded the IRA limit, IRAs would not provide any marginal incentive to save.
Thus, one preliminary step toward determining the effects of IRAs is to focus on the characteristics of IRA contributors. If contributors are mainly those for whom IRAs and other saving are very good substitutes, the effects on saving of raising the annual contribution limit will be small or negative. We identify two such groups: those who are already older than 59-1/2 (and therefore face no early withdrawal penalty) and those with large amounts of non-IRA financial assets (who therefore have a reduced need to use all of these assets as a cushion against adverse events). We define non-IRA financial assets (NIFA) to include checking, saving and money market accounts, certificates of deposit, stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. These assets represent relatively liquid funds available for transfer into IRAs. 6
6 Assets do not need to be "cashed in" to be placed into IRAs, so investors need not incur capital gains taxes to love stocks to IRAs. In addition, assets already in an IRA can be sold, as long as the proceeds stay in the account. In fact, some limited short-term borrowing from IRAs is also allowed without penalty. These considerations should make IRAs very good substitutes for other assets for households with large amounts of non-IRA assets. Over two-thirds of all positive contributions were made by households with NIFA in excess of $20,000. Approximately 75% were made by households where either the head was 59 or older or the household held more than $20,000 in NIFA; these households accounted for 61% of all IRA accounts and 73% of all accounts that contributed the maximum amount. Thus, the data indicate that the majority of IRAs are held by households for whom the early withdrawal penalty either does not apply or is unlikely ever to matter.
These facts have important implications. A commonly-made argument is that most households cannot easily "reshuffle" other saving into IRAs because the financial assets held by a typical household are very small.
For example, Feldstein and Feenberg (1983) show that a large majority of the population held less than the annual IRA contribution limit in non-IRA financial assets in their sample. Venti and Wise (1989, p. 25) We believe these arguments are misleading: although the typical household holds very few financial assets, the typical IRA-holding household owns very high levels of other financial assets. Table 2 shows data on median NlFA holdings for various groups. The data indicate a large 7 The data in Table 1 exclude households if (i) the head is younger than 25 in 1986 (because of data problems noted by Avery and Kenickell (1988b) ), (ii) the household changed marital status in 1983-1986 (because we can not calculate their IRA contribution limit), or (iii) either the head or spouse is self-employed (because it is difficult to calculate 1986 IRA balances for this group--see Appendix C). The calculation of IRA contributions is described in Appendix C. Data on other characteristics of IRA holders are presented in Venti and Wise (1986 , 1987a , 1987b and Feenberg and Skinner (1989a) . 2 Non-IRA financial assets are defined as checking, saving, and money market accounts, certificates of deposit, stocks, bonds, and mutual funds. Venti and Wise (1986 , 1987a . 1987b ) estimate a model of IRA a n d non-IRA saving that attempts to allow for both heterogeneity and asset substitutability.
Their main results are that increasing the annual contribution limit would raise IRA saving and that only 3%-20% of the increased IRA contributions would be financed by reductions in other saving. 9 Roughly 35% would be financed by reductions in taxes, 10 and the 8 Feenberg and Skinner (1989a) suggest that they avoid this problem because they control for initial wealth, which they argue reflects the household's taste for saving. However, current accumulated wealth depends on many other factors, including previous earning shocks, future earning prospects, inheritances, health, family size, age, and hence may not adequately reflect tastes for saving.
9 Venti and Wise (1987b, 1989) find that about 3% of the increase in IRA contributions due to a limit change would come from other assets. These papers are most comparable to the current one in that they employ data on the level of non-IRA saving. Venti and Wise (1986, 1987a) place the figure between 7% and 20%, but use data on only the sign of non-IRA saving rather than the level. Because the key issue is how the level of non-IRA saving changes when the IRA limits change, it is open to question whether the latter models provide useful guides.
10 Venti i and Wise use data from a time period where IRA contributions were fully deductible.
remaining 45-66% would be financed by reductions in consumption. 11 They conclude that little substitution of IRAs and other saving occurs, and that "contributions to IRAs represent substantial net saving increases" (Venti and Wise, 1986, p. 594) .
Because Venti and Wise present the only formal model of IRAs in the previous literature, it is worthwhile to highlight several features of their approach. First, consumers are assumed to allocate income to consumption, IRA saving, and non-IRA saving according to the following function:
where Y is disposable income, t is the marginal tax rate, S 1 is IRA saving, S2 is non-IRA saving, and a, j3, k, aI, and a2 are parameters. 12 Al though this "allocation function" approach yields closed-form solutions for IRA and other saving, it is not clear what underlying utility function would be consistent with maximization of (1). 13
Second, Deaton (1987) notes that individual characteristics that are presumably important determinants of saving behavior--e.g., assets or age--do not have first order effects in the saving equations, Individual attributes enter only through interactions (via a and /3) with income, and thus affect only the marginal propensity to save rather than the level of 11 Venti i and Wise assume that the entire reduction in taxes is consumed. In our simulations reported below, we allow households to save some portion of the reduction.
12 The first term equals consumption and is derived from the budget constraint.
13 Alternatively, if V is meant to represent preferences explicitly, maximization of (1) implies that utility is obtained directly from the level of saving rather than from the quantity of goods consumed. saving directly.
14 Third, the effects of changes in the annual contribution limit depend on parameters (k, a, and /J> that are estimated on the whole sample. 15 These effects therefore rest on comparisons (which in this case are complicated and nonlinear) between households with IRAs and otherwise identical ones who do not contribute. Consequently, the work is subject to the same problem as that of Hubbard (1984) and Feenberg and Skinner (1989a) : unless there is a way to ensure that unobservable tastes for saving are not correlated with the decision to buy an IRA, their results may understate the degree of substitutability between IRAs and other saving.
The importance of this problem can best be seen by examining the argument (Venti and Wise 1987b, p. 20) that for IRAs to be a perfect substitute for other saving, every saver would have to hold an IRA.
16 Since only about 20% of their sample held IRAs, it is not surprising that they reject the hypothesis of perfect substitutability. However it is clearly possible that a large portion of IRA holders (e.g. those with large amounts of NIFA or who are older than 59) find IRAs to be perfect substitutes for other saving, while those vithout IRAs do not.
In the next sections, we develop and estimate an alternative model of 14 For example, the non-IRA saving equation for IRA holders that contribute less than the limit is (for k + 0)
where a and @ vary with individual characteristics, X, and are restricted to lie between 0 and 1 using the normal distribution:
15 In the empirical version, the effects of limit correlations among the error terms.
a-+(Xa) and fi-+(Xb).
changes also depend on 16 Perfect substitutability occurs in their model when k-l and a-0.5. At the beginning of each period, the consumer receives labor income
IRA and

Yj
We set Yj to zero for simplicity. To make the problem interesting, we assume that Yp is uncertain and the consumer cannot borrow. If the realization of Yp is sufficiently low, the consumer will have to cash in any first period IRA saving early and thus incur a penalty.
Define the consumer's available resources at the beginning of each 17 Other analyses of IRAs include Andrews and Bradford (1988), Collins and Wykoff (1987) , Galper and Byce (1986) , Cravelle (1989) , O'Neil and Thompson (1987) , and Summers (1986) .
period as V,. The consumer's problem is to
(5b)
where V is 
Ej
is the expectation operator conditional on all information available at the beginning of period j, and t is the tax rate. B o r r o w i n g c o n s t r a i n t s are captured in (3). Equation (4) is simply the per-period budget constraint: income must be allocated either to consumption or to net contributions to saving. Equation (4) does not rule out shifting already existing assets from one form of saving to another. Equation (5) describes the evolution of available resources for consumption.
To generate closed form solutions, we assume that utility is given by WCj) --(k-Cj)2. The quadratic (or certainty-equivalent) specification has been widely used, particularly in the macroeconomics literature.
18
18 Issues regarding certainty-equivalence are discussed by Zeldes (1989) and Deaton and Huellbauer (1980) . No other commonly used specification yields closed forms. dissaving should occur through non-IRA assets until they are fully depleted.
In the first period, the consumer has both an interesting consumption choice and an interesting portfolio choice. Although attracted by the potentially high rate of return on IRAs, she may be deterred by the prospect of having to withdraw funds in period 2 and incurring a penalty. As shovn where the 6's depend on the o's and @'s. 20 Equation (7) represents the SI and So that would occur in the absence of any contribution limits on SI. If a c t u a l SI is constrained to lie between zero and L, the corresponding So equation when the S, constraint
is binding is determined by substituting the constrained value of SI into (6).
L e t sp -alk + 62U1 + 63 -desired IRA saving. Then To allow for the possible existence of such differences between households with IRAs and those without IRAs, we show in Appendix A that (10) can be rewritten as
The model is then given by (8). (9), and (11). Equations (11) and (9) describe IRA holders that contribute the maximum and less than the maximum, respectively. Note that So for both groups is the same linear function of k and WI, with an added term for limit contributors, reflecting the spillover of excess desired IRA saving (Sf-L) into non-IRA saving. Equation (8) provides a different function of k and WI for the So of non-contributors.
Thus, the model explicitly allows for differences in saving behavior between households with IRAs and observationally equivalent households without IRAs.
Finally, the substitutability of IRA contributions and other saving is measured by a4. For example, if a4 -1 (0), all (none) of excess desired IRA saving would be placed in non-IRA financial assets. As noted above, in period 2, IRAs will be perfect substitutes for other saving. However, in the first period, IRAS will generally be imperfect substitutes for other saving, due solely to the possibility of having to make an early withdrawal and thus incur a penalty. However, if the need to make an early withdrawal 21 For example, in (8) dSo/dW1 -a2, where a is a function of p and other parameters of the model. Thus, two househol 3s with different subjective discount rates would have different savings responses to increases in wealth. Intuitively, the household with the higher discount rate would consume a greater portion of the increased wealth.
vanishes, due to either a high lower bound on the distribution of Y2 or a large initial holding of non-IRA financial assets, IRAs would be p e r f e c t substitutes for other saving, even in the first period. Thus, the model predicts that the substitutability will depend on age, assets, and the level and expected variability of income.
I V . Empirical Analysis ( A ) Specification
An empirical specification consistent with the model above is (8), (9) and (ll), where k is interpreted as a vector of household characteristics.
Equations ( The model distinguishes sharply between IRA contributors and 22 We e set the lower limit on IRA contributions equal to zero, so the model distinguishes between IRA contributors and non-contributors (rather than I RA holders and non-holders). This is the appropriate focus for a model of saving.
noncontributors. Unlike previous researchers, we do not impose equal coefficients and error variances on the two groups. Instead, we measure substitutability by comparing limit contributors to non-limit contributors.
The only difference between these two groups is that the former has excess IRA demand, which is allowed to influence non-IRA saving. Comparing limit contributors to interior contributors, rather than to non-contributors, controls for a specific type of heterogeneity where households with IRAs and households without IRAs have different determinants of saving. As the model is formulated, we are able to test the validity of this distinction below.
Errors are assumed to be additive and distributed bivariate normal. Holding other variables constant, the spillover effect of excess desired IRA saving into non-IRA saving is measured by 'I. As suggested by the theoretical specification, we allow q to vary across households as a (linear) function of age, non-IRA financial assets, and income. The effects of changes in L will depend on q and the correlations among the errors. 26 Marginal tax rates are calculated on the basis of reported income and demographic characteristics using a tax simulation routine described in Scholz (1989) .
27 A household is considered liquidity constrained if it reported that (a) it had been turned down for credit in the previous three years and could not eventually obtain the credit it wanted, or (b) it had not applied for credit because it thought it would be turned down. See Japelli (1990) for an analysis using this information.
balances. Debt holdings have a theoretically ambiguous effect on IRA
holdings. 28
A variety of financial variables are included in the non-IRA saving equations. These include income, changes in income, and income squared, and levels of financial assets, nonliquid wealth, IRAs and debt in 1983. We also include age and marginal tax rates. All of these variables are defined fully in Appendix C , with summary data presented in Appendix Table 1 .
In estimating the model, we exclude households from the sample if:
(i) the head is 24 or younger, (ii) the head changed marital status during 1983-86, or (iii) either the head or spouse was self-employed, all for reasons provided in footnote 7. We also exclude households in which the head was 65 or older in 1983, to maintain comparability with previous studies and to avoid the added complexities of modelling saving by the elderly. 29 However, for this group, IRAs should be a perfect substitute for other saving since there is no early withdrawal penalty. Therefore, excluding the elderly presumably biases our results away from finding strong substitutability.
Finally, to reduce the extreme range of saving in the sample, 30 we exclude households if the absolute value of saving or dissaving exceeded $75,000 over the three year period. This restriction is potentially the most troubling, due to problems arising from selecting on an endogenous 28 To the extent that households are financing IRA borrowing, there should be a positive relationship; to increased debt payments make IRAs less attractive, due i l l i q u i d i t y , there should be a negative relationship.
29
purchases by the extent that to the latter's For example, see Bernheim (1989) or Hurd (1989) therein. and the references 30 The change in real wealth ranged from less than -$30 million to more than $30 million over the sample (Avery and Kenickell (1988b) ).
v a r i a b l e . However, for households saving more than $75,000, limit changes are likely to be inframarginal. Thus, this restriction presumably biases our results away from finding strong substitutability. To test the sensitivity of our results to this selection criterion, we also report outcomes for savings thresholds of $50,000 and $100,000. As will be made clear below, the results are similar for these thresholds. However, using thresholds that are much higher (e. g., $250,000) lead to predictions of implausibly large amounts of substitution which make it clear that we do not adequately capture the saving behavior of the extremely rich. Appendix Table 2 shows the number of households excluded by each selection criterion.
( B ) Results Table 3 presents results for estimation of (12)- (14) However, the actual level of substitutability implied by the estimates will also depend on the correlation and variances of the errors.
EffecSs
To help interpret the parameter estimates, we analyze the effects of a hypothetical change in the annual contribution limit, supposing that the limits were increased by $1000 per year for each household. Thus, the new limits would be $3000 for singles and $5000 ($3250) for married couples with two workers (one worker). For each household, the procedure involves (i)
simulating predicted values for ST and S 0 using the coefficients and error terms calculated from the estimated distributions (formulas are given in Appendix 8);
(ii) calculating the change in IRA saving and non-IRA saving given the change in the contribution limit, but holding other variables constant; and (iii) calculating the associated tax savings. The 32 Willingness to take risks is a dummy variable that is coded as 1 if the household reports that it is willing to take "above average" or "exceptional" risks in order to obtain "above average" or exceptional" returns, and 0 otherwise.
33 The coefficient on income is negative. However, as described above, r) should depend on the expected variability of income as well as the level, so the coefficient is proxying for both of these effects. is obtained by calculating, for each simulation, the change in IRA saving and non-IRA saving after increasing the contribution limit by $1000, but holding other variables constant. The average of the changes is reported.
2 This figure is obtained by, first, calculating the changes in saving as described in note 1, and, second, calculating the change in non-IRA saving as a percentage of the change in IRA contributions for each simulation. The average of the percentages is reported. simulation was done 15 times for each household and the average of the changes, in levels and percentages, are presented in Table 4 . Alternatively, if households consumed 10% of the tax cut in the first year, non-IRA saving would fall by about 64% (-96%-32%) of the increased IRA contributions, while tax cuts would again finance 36%. Consumption would not change at all, so that the net saving effect would be zero. If households consumed more that 10% of the tax cut, consumption would rise, and the net saving effect of raising IRA contribution limits would be negative. There is nothing perverse about this possibility; the rise in consumption would reflect the wealth effects associated with IRAs.
Thus, although we cannot state exactly what the net saving effect would be, our estimates allow us to place an upper bound on that effect.
For the estimates with a saving threshold of $75,000, the maximum net saving effect is approximately 4% of the increased IRA contributions. This maximum will occur when all of the tax cut is saved.
Sensitivity Analysis
We have performed sensitivity analysis of these results along a number of dimens ions. As mentioned above, perhaps the most troubling restriction is the exclusion of households with absolute values of saving or dissaving above a given threshold. Table 4 shows that reestimating and resimulating the model with thresholds of $50,000 and $100,000 does not have important effects on the basic conclusions. The maximum portion of increased IRA contributions that would represent new saving are 9% and 25%, respectively.
In either case, the vast majority of increased IRA contributions in response to a limit change would represent asset transfers rather than net saving.
Not surprisingly, as the threshold rises the estimated q rises as well.
This reflects the increased preponderance of households that save large amounts and for whom IRAs provide inframarginal saving effects.
It may be thought that the results are biased by including households where the head was between 60 and 65 years old in 1983.
For these households, IRAs will be perfect substitutes for other saving, but it would not be desirable for the results to depend on the inclusion of this group, as they are presumably not the primary focus of the policy. In fact, removing this group from the sample has a negligible impact on the results.
We have also estimated the model with interest rates set at 11% for non-IRA financial assets, 14% for IRAs, and 17% for consumer debt. In this case, the mean q is 0.7239, which suggests a maximum net saving effect on the order of 25% 34 Finally, to test the model's ability to distinguish between different levels of q, we estimated the model with the constraint q -0 imposed. The data strongly reject this restriction.
35,36
Assessinn the Model
In order to guage the reliability of the underlying model, Table 5 presents data on hov well the model fits saving decisions by income
category. The first panel shows that the model predicts the percentages of IRA holders and limit contributors well, both overall and by income class. We have also tested the sensitivity and reliability of our results.
One important caveat to our results is t h a t , at a general level, household   s a v i n g i s d i f f i c u l t t o p r e d i c t u s i n g m i c r o d a t a . This caveat, of course, applies equally to other studies using micro data. We also note that our estimates are based on 8 period in which IRA contributions were fully deductible, whereas deductibility has been limited recently.
Our Other authors have raised several additional issues concerning IRAs, including the importance of heavy public promotion of IRAs (Venti and Vise);
"falsely-constrained" households, e. g., a married couple that contributes exactly $2000 to an IRA (Feenberg and Skinner, 1989a) , and the timing of IRA contributions (Summers, 1986) . Although these issues certainly merit further analysis, we note that the existence of heavy promotion, falsely However, when both IRAs and other assets exist, the expression for W 3 is more complicated. L e t x-1 Y2 + SCRC -C2 be liquid resources available for saving in period 2. Since IRAs are perfect substitutes for other s a v i n g in period 2, the optimal portfolio allocation rule is to place the first $ L of X into IRAs and the remainder into non-IRA saving. W3 depends on X as follovs3g :
where Cjh is optimal consumption in state h, and W3 is obtained by 40 Details available upon request.
To derive (11) in the text, note that, dropping the 1 superscript, * when S I -L, both SI and SO can be written in two ways, by (9) and (10) -Using (10) for So and (9) for SI yields:
sO -elk + a2Wl + a3 -a4(61k+62Wl+63).
By ( -1 if head of household is unmarried, 0 otherwise.
-1 if household reports that it is willing to take "above average" or "exceptional" risks to earn "above average" or "exceptional" returns.
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